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This paper aims to re-evaluate the Chipko movement (1973-1981), a forest 
protection movement in the Uttarakhand hill region in northern India, which became 
widely known throughout the world through its image of local people hugging trees. 
Although the Chipko movement became famous as a good example of the 
“environmentalism of the poor” in the 1980s, it began to be criticised after the 1990s 
as the movement ended in failure due to the fact that the local people’s “true” desire 
to develop the local economy by using the forest’s resources was denied by the 
movement’s achievement of a total ban on commercial logging. Moreover, some 
scholars have stressed that the prohibition of commercial deforestation was not the 
outcome of the Chipko movement, but rather the consequence of the victory of the 
Department of Environment over the Ministry of Agriculture at the Centre. Against 
these previous studies, this paper argues that the Chipko movement did played a 
role in transforming the forest management systems, and the movement was also 
significant for the formation of a new network of social activists. 
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Introduction 
This paper aims to re-evaluate the Chipko 
movement (1973-1981), a forest protection 
movement in the Uttarakhand hill region in 
northern India, which became widely known 
throughout the world through its image of local 
people hugging trees. Although the Chipko 
movement became famous as a good example 
of the “environmentalism of the poor” in the 
1980s, it began to be criticised after the 1990s 
as the movement ended in failure due to the fact 
that the local people’s “true” desire to develop 
the local economy by using the forest’s 
resources was denied by the movement’s 
achievement of a total ban on commercial 
logging. Moreover, some scholars have stressed 
that the prohibition of commercial deforestation 
was not the outcome of the Chipko movement, 
but rather the consequence of the victory of the 
Department of Environment over the Ministry 
of Agriculture at the Centre. Against these 
previous studies, this paper argues that the 
Chipko movement did played a role in 
transforming the forest management systems, 
and the movement was also significant for the 
formation of a new network of social activists. 
 
1. Chipko Movement as an 
“Environmentalism of the Poor”? 
The Chipko movement began in the village of 
Mandal in April 1973.1 To resist commercial 
                                                
1 The description of the development of the Chipko 
deforestation by timber contractors coming over 
from outside the Uttarakhand, village residents, 
including many women, used the tactics of 
hugging trees for the first time. The lumber 
quota that had been allocated to a local-based 
association every year was not approved for 
that year. Instead, a sports goods manufacturer 
in Allahabad obtained the licence to use the 
trees in the forest in Mandal. At the town 
meeting to protest this fact, the participants 
approved the proposal by Chandi Prasad Bhatt 
for using the tactic of “hugging” trees that were 
scheduled to be cut down.2 When the timber 
contractor’s staff entered the Mandal forest, 
local residents stood at the forefront and risked 
their lives to protect the forest in a non-violent 
manner, which prevented deforestation. After 
that, the contractors came over several times, 
but could not cut the trees because large 
numbers of local residents used the tactic of 
protesting by hugging each tree scheduled to be 
cut down. From that time onward, this 
“hugging” approach was employed again and 
again in other areas in the Uttarakhand. The 
Chipko movement spread to many locations in 
the Uttarakhand. When timber contractors came 
to Reni village in March 1974, it is said that a 
                                                                            
movement in this section is based on (Mishra and 
Tripathi 1978, Weber 1988, Mawdsley 1998, Guha 
2009) and the author’s interviews at the locality (2003-
2010). 
2 Some researchers insist that Ghansyam Sailani 
suggested the “hugging” approach for the first time, 
while other researchers argue that this tactic was not 
suggested by either of them, and that local female 
residents spontaneously took this approach. 
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large number of women led by Gaura Devi, a 
leader of the village women’s organisation, kept 
an all-night vigil for four days at the logging 
area to prevent deforestation, enduring the cold 
weather as well as the contractor’s threats. In 
addition, Sunderlal Bahuguna and others were 
active in demonstrations against forest auctions. 
In October 1974, for instance, he entered the 
auction hall at Uttarkashi and made a plea for 
the halting of proceedings. He also played a 
leading role in conducting the “Askot-Arakot 
Foot March (pad yÁtra)” in October-November 
1974. In this foot march, participants walked 
from Askot, a village in east Uttarakhand, 
approximately 700km to Arakot, a village in 
west Uttarakhand, in order to disseminate the 
messages of the Chipko movement to the whole 
of the Uttarakhand.3 In 1978, the Chipko 
movement entered a new phase in Advani 
village in the western Uttarakhand with the 
launch of a new slogan by the villagers. The 
new slogan was “What do the forests bear? 
Land, water and fresh air!” This new slogan 
was said to reflect a new awareness for 
forest/environmental conservation, which was 
different from the movement’s previous 
mainstream slogan, “What do the forests bear? 
Resins, timber and business!” The participants 
in the movement at Advani called for 
abandoning local community’s rights in 
addition to the outside contractor’s right to cut 
                                                
3 For this “Askot-Arakot Foot March”, see (Ishizaka 
2007). 
trees and insisted that forests should be 
preserved for environmental conservation 
purposes. The background to this change was 
said to be the pitiful conditions in the rural area, 
such as a shortage of fuel-use firewood or 
fodder, loss of top soil and water shortages. The 
villagers considered that this desperate situation 
was the result of the disappearance of the 
forests. The villagers around Advani village, 
and especially Bahuguna, had realized that it 
was necessary to prevent deforestation if they 
wanted to improve people’s living standards. 
After that, the Chipko movement came to its 
climax in January 1979. At Badhiyargarh 
village, Bahuguna started his “fast unto death” 
to oppose deforestation. On the eleventh day 
after he began fasting (upvÁs or vrat), he was 
arrested and went into detention. Since this 
event further fuelled the resistance of the 
participants, more than 3,000 people rushed 
into the village from neighbouring villages. It is 
said that they continued non-violent resistance 
for eleven days until the contractor withdrew 
from the site. Finally, the Chipko movement 
arrived at a conclusion when the Government of 
Uttar Pradesh ordered a ban on the commercial 
deforestation of living trees above 1,000m in 
Uttar Pradesh on March 18, 1981.  
 The academic evaluation of the Chipko 
movement has changed drastically. The 
literature in the 1980s regarded it as a 
successful movement because it was thought 
that the total ban on commercial deforestation,
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which was thought to be a major achievement 
of the movement, would benefit subaltern 
people in the area. For example, Guha (2009), 
who considered the Chipko movement both a 
shining example of a long tradition of peasant 
resistance in the Uttarakhand region and an 
outstanding illustration of the 
“environmentalism of the poor,”4 indicated that 
the total ban on deforestation not only saved the 
minimum subsistence levels and livelihoods of 
the poor people but also prevented the 
exploitation of natural resources by the private 
logging companies outside the region. He also 
stressed that it was remarkable that the forest-
based poor people’s voices gained international 
recognition through their movement. In 
contrast, subsequent studies since the mid-
1990s have revealed that the movement ended 
in failure because the poor people’s “true” 
desire to develop the local economy by using 
the forest’s resources was denied by the 
                                                
4 The “environmentalism of the poor” was the notion 
proposed by Ramachandra Guha and others. 
According to these authors, the claim that people in 
the Third World were too poor to care about 
environmental issues was totally groundless. In the 
South, there is another environmentalism, the 
“environmentalism of the poor”, which is different 
from mainstream environmentalism in developed 
countries, which focuses on efforts such as preserving 
wildlife or the fight against urban pollution. Poor 
people (often landless or tribal) who largely rely on 
natural resources for their livelihoods must fight, as a 
matter of survival, against developmental projects 
such as large-scale deforestation or the construction of 
large dams promoted by their governments or private 
enterprises; such development literally threatens their 
lives. In many cases, their struggles to protect natural 
resources not only involve protecting their own lives, 
they are also about obtaining social justice and 
equality. 
complete prohibition on tree cutting, and the 
possibility for the economic development in the 
Uttarakhand through the forest-related industry 
was shut down by the ban on felling (Mawdsley 
1998, Rangan 2000, Linkenbach 2007). 
Moreover, another scholar has stated that the 
transformation of forest policy was not derived 
from any movements but was the result of a 
power struggle between politicians and 
bureaucrats in Delhi (Pathak 1994). 
 A social movement is defined as “a 
transformation-oriented collective action, which 
derives from people’s discontents with present 
conditions or certain prospective situations” 
(Hasegawa and Machimura 2004: 19). 
Evaluations of the Chipko movement in 
previous studies were based too much on the 
following two criteria: the major achievement 
of the movement (or the most significant 
“transformation,” which the movement brought 
about) and whether or not the “people’s 
discontents” were dissolved. However, the 
actual process of how the total ban on 
commercial felling was realised has to be re-
examined because, as Pathak (1994) suggested, 
it was not achieved solely by the movement. 
Moreover, although the dissolution of the 
people’s discontents should certainly be an 
important indicator in evaluating a movement, 
other ways of evaluation can also be explored.  
 This paper employs the following two 
strategies in order to re-evaluate the Chipko 
movement and establish a methodology for 
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analysing the outcomes of social movements in 
general. First, it examines the results of social 
movements not by using the simple schema of a 
cause-and-effect relationship but by depending 
on the proposition that movements are variables 
inside complex systems of social dynamics. 
What is going on in society takes place as an 
accumulation of various intentional or 
unintentional behaviours and unprecedented 
events. Social movements constitute parts of 
such a complex social system. Moreover, social 
movements themselves are also complex 
systems. It is important to unravel the chains of 
various events carefully and identify exactly 
how movements play a role in the processes 
involved. Regarding the Chipko movement, we 
need to investigate the meanings of the 
complete prohibition on commercial logging, of 
the process of how the prohibition was realised 
and of how the movement was involved in this 
process.  
 Second, one should not stress too much the 
subaltern people’s view of the movement, or 
how the movement brought direct profits to the 
subaltern peoples. The contributions by 
Mawdsley, Rangan and Linkenbach, who tried, 
through their fieldwork, to expose the 
“realities” of how local residents regarded the 
ban on deforestation were certainly worthwhile. 
However, we cannot assume that there is such 
an eternal and unchangeable entity as the 
“subalterns’ voice.” There are many kinds of 
opinions among the local people in many cases, 
and these opinions can change according to the 
situation.5 For example, we have to keep in 
mind that the mood of a period can affect 
peoples’ opinions in that period. In the 
Uttarakhand, I think the 1990s was the time of a 
backlash regarding the evaluation of the Chipko 
movement, which ended in 1983. Especially in 
1994-96, the Chipko movement was held up as 
one of the main reasons for the backwardness 
of the Uttarakhand by the protagonists of the 
Uttarakhand movement, which aimed at 
creating a new and separate hill state of 
Uttarakhand. According to them, the Chipko 
movement prevented the people from seizing a 
precious opportunity to develop forest-related 
industries in the area.6 Since Mawdsley, 
Rangan and Linkenbach conducted their 
fieldwork mainly in the mid-1990s, their 
analyses could have been biased by such an 
atmosphere in the Uttarakhand movement. 
Moreover, the focus of peoples’ discontents can 
also change in accordance with the situation. 
The local people in the Uttarakhand in the 
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, who 
every day saw a large number of trees being cut 
down with chain saws and taken away to the 
outside plains by truck or through waterways 
and rivers, and who then suffered from frequent
                                                
5 Mawdsley, Rangan and Linkenbach originally tried 
to depict the variety of local opinions, but 
unfortunately their work focused almost exclusively 
on people’s economic aspirations. 
6 For the Uttarakhand movement, see (Robinson 1996, 
Mawdsley 1998, Kumar 2000, Pathak 2000, Robinson 
2001, Linkenbach 2005, Kumar 2010). 
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soil erosion and the drying up of springs on the 
slopes of the denuded hills, might have been 
conscious of a crisis or felt angry about the 
situation. However, it is natural that the same 
people or the next generation in the 
Uttarakhand in the 1990s had different 
discontents because they might feel impatient 
about the stagnation in the local economy after 
the ban on commercial logging. I was very 
surprised when I saw recently a shot in which 
trees in this region were cut down and dozens 
of logs were flowing down a waterway in the 
documentary, “The Axing of the Himalayas”, 
which was produced and broadcast by the BBC 
in 1982. For the generations born after the late 
1980s, it may be difficult to get a real sense of 
the crisis that people felt in the 1970s. 
Therefore, the subjective evaluation of the 
movement by the local or subaltern people 
should be complemented with an analysis of the 
objective context within the framework of a 
more comprehensive and long-term perspective, 
although this paper does not deal with this issue 
further. The latter part of the paper, first, 
investigates the meanings of the complete 
prohibition on commercial logging, of the 
process of how the prohibition was realised and 
of how the movement was involved in this 
process. Then, this paper clarifies how the 
activists’ network was formed during the 
movement and how it survived after the 
movement. 
 
1. The Meanings of the Total Ban on 
Commercial Deforestation in the 
Uttarakhand 
This section, firstly, attempts to outline how 
forest policy in the Uttarakhand changed from 
the 1970s to the 1990s by using data from 
Forest Statistics and the Working/Management 
Plans of the Forest Departments (FD), and then 
to clarify how the Chipko movement played a 
role in the process of the realisation of the total 
ban on commercial deforestation in 1981. 
 
1-1. Transformation of Forest Policy in the 
Uttarakhand from the 1970s to the 1990s 
Forest management policy in the Uttarakhand 
from the 1970s to the 1990s was totally 
changed. The changes in and continuities of the 
policy can be summarised as follows. (1) The 
basic attitude behind forest management policy 
was changed from one that was market-oriented 
to one that was preservation-oriented. (2) The 
emerging private companies’ access to India’s 
forests was nearly totally shut down in the 
Uttarakhand. (3) Although local people’s 
participation in forest management under the 
name of Joint Forest Management began in the 
1990s, starting in the Uttarakhand as in the 
other regions in India, the control of the large 
area of the forest by the FD was unshaken.  
 First, the basic attitude behind forest 
management policy was transformed from one 
that was market-oriented to one that was 
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preservation-oriented. In other words, the forest 
started to be regarded in terms of its 
environmental value, instead of being 
considered as an economically profitable 
resource. This change occurred nationwide and 
we can also clearly perceive the change in the 
policies of FD in the Uttarakhand. In the 
Chakrata Forest Division in the western part of 
the Uttarakhand, for instance, there was a 
dramatic change between 1977 and 1987 
(Srivastava 1977, Joshi 1987). In the 
“Introduction” to the Working Plan for the 
period from 1977-78 to 1987-88, commercial 
exploitation of the forest was strongly promoted 
(Srivastava 1977: 1).  
Most of the remote and inaccessible areas of 
the division have since opened up due to the 
construction of several motor roads in 
recent years. The hitherto unexploited 
species of industrial importance are 
proposed to be exploited in the new plan 
under an Industrial Timber (Overlapping) 
working circle.  
 However, only ten years later, the 
“Introduction” to the next Management Plan 
for the period from 1987-88 to 1997-98 in the 
same Forest Division shows how quickly they 
changed their stance and started to behave as 
the prime custodian of the environment (Joshi 
1987: 1).  Keeping in view the latest 
Government policies and in order to contribute 
towards the protection of the fragile Himalayan 
ecosystem, a more conservational approach has 
been adopted. The salient features of the plan 
are:  
(1) There are to be no green fellings;  
(2) only dry uprooted and broken trees will 
 be removed;  
(3) in vulnerable areas no felling will be 
 permitted for any purpose whatsoever.  
 The drastic change of attitude in the Forest 
Divisions in the Uttarakhand in the mid-1980s 
was precisely in tune with the nationwide 
current: FD was taken from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and merged with the Department of 
Environment, and a separate Ministry of 
Environment and Forests was formed in 1985 
under the strong initiative of the then Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi (Pathak 1994). 
However, we also have to pay attention to the 
phrase, “there are to be no green fellings”, in 
the “Introduction” to the 1986 Management 
Plan cited above. The phrase indicated the order 
of the Government of Uttar Pradesh on the ban 
on green felling issued on March 18, 1981, 
which was appended in the same Management 
Plan. It states (Datta 1987: 179):  
No fresh contracts, allotment or any 
commitment for felling of green trees for 
commercial purposes above a height of 
1000 meters above sea level should 
hereafter be made till the expert committee 
being set up for the purpose has submitted
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its report and the state government has 
taken a decision on it. 
 The direct cause for the transformation of 
the basic attitude toward the management of 
forests from a market-oriented one to a 
conservationist one in the Forest Divisions in 
the Uttarakhand might have been the order from 
the Centre. However, at the same time, the 
Uttarakhand had a distinct history, which was 
preceded by the politics at the Centre at the 
beginning of the 1980s, as we shall see later in 
the next section.  
 Second, the emerging private companies’ 
access to India’s forests was nearly totally shut 
down in the Uttarakhand. Although India 
started to liberalise its economy in the 1990s, 
globalisation quickly gearing up after that (with 
some scholars even arguing that India made a 
“pro-business shift” in the 1980s (Rodrik and 
Subramanian 2004)), India’s forests, which 
comprised 23.41% of the geographical area of 
India in 2009 (Rawat and Chandola 2010: 180), 
have been kept away from market principles 
from the 1980s until now.  
 In the Uttarakhand, the production of 
timber, for instance, once almost doubled in the 
1960s (from 767,000m3 in 1966-67 to 
1,411,000m3 in 1971-72), then decreased from 
the late 1970s (947,000m3 in 1981-82 and 
686,000m3 in 1986-87), became less than one-
third the amount of 1971-72 at the beginning of 
the 1990s (41,000m3 in 1992-93), and finally 
became almost one-sixth of the amount of 
1971-72 in 2009-10 (242,621m3) (Misra 1983: 
64, Khati 2006: 35-37, Rawat and Chandola 
2010: 67-69). Further, in 1966-67 the timber 
was allotted to various industries such as; 
plywood to Ashok Plywood Trading Co. 
(Jawalapur), Plywood Products (Sitapur), 
Bharat Plywood Udyog (Ramnagar), and 
Kumaon Plywood Udyog (Ramnagar); 
matchwood to W.I.M.Co. (Bareilly); and saw 
mills to Lokmani-Ishwari Datt Sangauri 
(Haldwani), Bhatia Saw Mills (Hardwar), 
Kailash Industries (Haldwani), and Himalaya 
Wood Industry (Haldwani) (Soni 1969: 400-
408). However, after the UP Forest Corporation 
Act 1975 was enforced under the Congress (I) 
government in Uttar Pradesh, a state-owned 
Corporation was created and began to 
monopolise the production and sale of timber 
and other forest commodities (Rangan 2000: 
163).7 According to the Uttarakhand Forest 
Statistics 2010, only two private companies 
were supplied with forest products in 2009-10: 
Century Paper Mill and Star Paper Mill were 
supplied 4,336,000kg of Eucalyptus (in 2001-
02, those two companies were supplied 
65,000,000kg of Eucalyptus) (Rawat and 
Chandola 2010: 67-69). All timber, firewood 
and some non-timber forest products (NTFP) 
have been auctioned and retailed through 
depots managed by the Uttaranchal Forest 
                                                
7 The UP Forest Corporation was originally meant to 
employ local people, but it was said that it tended to 
hire labourers from Himachal Pradesh or western 
Nepal (Rangan 2000: 163-164). 
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Development Corporation after 2000-01 (Rawat 
and Chandola 2010: 67-69). It is doubtful if the 
Chipko movement was entirely responsible for 
the de-privatisation of forests because the 
initiative for this change started already in 
1975, which was before some sections of the 
Chipko movement made an environmentalist 
turn in 1978.  
 Third, more than 70% of the total forest 
area in the Uttarakhand continued to be 
controlled by the FD, in spite of the increase in 
the areas of Panchayat Forest (the forests under 
the management of the village 
councils) after the 1990s. In India, 
local people’s participation in 
forest management under the 
name of Joint Forest Management 
began in the 1990s (Yanagisawa 
2002, Nagamine 2003). The JFM 
in India aimed to stop the 
deterioration of the forest and to 
afforest denuded land in a 
collaboration between the FD and 
local people. This venture was launched 
because the long tradition, lasting from the 
colonial period, of a unitary forest management 
by the FD to protect the forests had turned out 
to be ineffective by the 1980s since 
deforestation and the deterioration of the forest 
were continuing at a rapid pace. This 
participatory approach was encouraged because 
it was regarded not only as a more effective 
system of forest governance but also because it 
could be an important tool for people’s 
empowerment.8 In the Uttarakhand, according 
to Forest Statistics, the areas of the Panchayat 
forests increased more than twofold from 
2,447.640km2 in 1969 to 5,449.642km2 in 
2011.9 However, the forest areas under the 
management of the FD have remained almost 
the same from 24,960.160 km2 in 1969 to 
24,414.804km2 in 2011.10 The increase in the 
areas of Panchayat Forest was produced by the 
decrease in the forest areas under the Revenue 
Department (6,072.000km2 in 1969 to 
                                                
8 After JFM in India in the 1990s, some South Asian 
countries were said to follow this example of 
participatory forest management. For critical analyses 
on JFM in India, see (Poffenberger 1996, Sundar et al. 
2002). 
9 The number for 1969 is calculated by tracing back to 
the district-wise data, since the seven districts which 
would constitute the separate Uttarakhand state in 
2000 had been in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Of 
5,449.642km2 in 2011, 139.653 km2 was Panchayat 
forest under FD management. 
10 Of 24,414.804 km2 in 2011, 139.653 km2 was 
Panchayat forest under FD management. 
Figure 1: Forest Area in the Uttarakhand according to 
Management (1969-2011)1 
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4,768.704km2 in 2011) and under private and 
other agencies (1,251.190 km2 in 1969 to 
157.517 km2 in 2011) (Soni 1969: 35-38, Rawat 
2011: 1). There is no clear sign of relations 
between the Chipko movement, the continuity 
of FD control and the increase in the areas of 
Panchayat Forest.  
 
1-2. The Chipko movement in the political 
process 
The Chipko movement was one of the key 
actors in the political process for the 
transformation of the forest management 
systems in the Uttarakhand in the following 
three ways: First, of the four investigation 
committees, which were established during the 
1970-80s regarding the management of forests 
in the Uttarakhand, at least two were directly 
set up in close relation with the activists in the 
movement; second, at least three formal 
demands of the movement were delivered 
directly to the top authorities; and third, an 
activist’s activities directly invoked a reaction 
from the government side.  
 Regarding forest management in the 
Uttarakhand, four investigation committees 
were founded (Mishra and Tripathi 1978, 
Weber 1988, Rangan 2000): (1) the Virendra 
Kumar Committee in 1974, (2) the M. S. 
Swaminathan Committee in 1974, (3) the K. N. 
Kaur Committee in 1980, and (4) the second M. 
S. Swaminathan Committee. Of the four, at 
least the first two were set up as a direct 
outcome of the activists’ approaches. 
According to Anupam Mishra and Satyendra 
Tripathi, following the Reni struggle in March 
1974, the then Chief Minister of the 
Government of Uttar Pradesh, H. N. Bahuguna, 
invited Chandi Prasad Bhatt and Sunderlal 
Bahuguna for discussions at Lucknow on April 
24, 1974. In that meeting, Bhatt proposed the 
setting up of an official committee to 
investigate whether the deforestation at Reni 
should be allowed and the Chief Minister 
agreed. Furthermore, the Minister allowed the 
appointment as the Chairperson of the 
committee someone unconnected with the 
Government, and it was Bhatt who visited and 
requested Dr. Virendra Kumar, of the Botany 
Department at Delhi College, to become the 
chairperson. Kumar accepted the chairmanship. 
The Governor of UP officially appointed the 
Reni Investigation Committee on May 9, 1974. 
Bhatt was also one of the nine members. The 
Committee was originally meant to submit its 
report by June 30, but its work took two years 
because Kumar insisted that the whole region, 
not only Reni, should be investigated. It finally 
submitted its report and the UP Government 
accepted the recommendations of the 
Committee. On October 15, 1977, tree-felling 
in the catchment area of Alakananda and its 
tributaries were banned for ten years (Mishra 
and Tripathi 1978: 29-35, Weber 1988: 46-51). 
After being inspired by the agitations at the 
auctions in October 1974, and following 
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discussions with Sunderlal Bahuguna, the Chief 
Minister set up another Committee to conduct 
comprehensive research of forest abuse in the 
entire region. M. S. Swaminathan, the Director-
General of the Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research, was nominated as the chairperson. 
The Government had also appointed Sunderlal 
Bahuguna to assist the Committee in surveying 
the forests in the north-western Uttarakhand. A 
moratorium on the auction of forests was also 
introduced up until the time this Committee 
completed its report. Although, for various 
reasons, the Committee never completed its 
report, in March 1982, the second Swaminathan 
Committee did submit its Report of the Task 
Force for the Study of Eco-Development in the 
Himalayan Regions. (Mishra and Tripathi 1978: 
31-33, Weber 46-47, 141-150, 156). 
 The idea for a ban on green felling first 
appeared in the resolution at the meeting of the 
Uttarakhand Sarvodaya Mandal at Almora in 
August 1974 (Weber 1988: 46). The meeting of 
the Uttarakhand Sarvodaya Mandal in June 
1977 again made a resolution to stop 
commercial green felling and to rest over-
tapped resin trees, and this was submitted to the 
then Prime Minister, Morarji Desai. It was said 
that Desai seemed sympathetic, but the State 
Government did not change its policy at that 
time (Weber 1988: 51, 135). The movement’s 
voice functioned as the real pressure on the 
State Government finally in October 1980 when 
Sunderlal Bahuguna submitted a memorandum 
signed by prominent public figures for a ban on 
felling, following the recommendation by the 
Central Government for the ban (Weber 1988: 
140). On March 18 the following year, the State 
Government ordered a total ban on commercial 
green felling.  
 It is also noteworthy that Sunderlal 
Bahuguna’s fast in January 1979 did have an 
effect on the State Government. After his arrest, 
he broke his fast on February 2, when the State 
Government declared that no felling or auctions 
would be carried out until a meeting was held 
between Sunderlal Bahuguna and the Chief 
Minister to discuss the issues (Weber 1988: 55-
56).  
 How did the Chipko movement contribute 
to the transformation of forest management 
systems in the Uttarakhand? First, the 
movement might have had a significant 
influence on the attitudinal turn from 
commercial forestry to conservationist forestry 
in two separate ways. The State Government 
order on March 18, 1981 on the total ban on 
commercial logging itself was mainly the direct 
result of the victory of the Department of 
Environment over the Ministry of Agriculture 
at the Centre. However, the idea for the total 
ban on tree cutting originated from the 
movement’s appeals. Mrs. Gandhi might have 
felt lucky when she found support from the 
movement for the formation of her new image 
as an environmentalist. But, at the same time, it 
might be more accurate to say that the
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movement side also utilised the 
environmentalist camp at the Centre to meet 
their own ends.  
 Moreover, the local activists’ appeals 
concerning the multiple functions of the forest, 
such as for the prevention of floods or 
landslides (Bahuguna 1979, 1983, Bhatt 1980), 
might have greatly contributed to the forging of 
a general understanding of the importance of 
forests. It is especially remarkable that Chapter 
19 “Scope and Potential for Development” in 
the Management Plan for the Chakrata Forest 
Division 1997-98 to 2006-07 began with the 
following paragraph (Singh 1997: 443).  
Whatever be the level of technological and 
material attainments of human being he 
always needs sustainable environment for 
his survival. Perhaps, that is why activists of 
Chipko movement used to chant this slogan 
for pressing their demand for imposing ban 
on indiscriminate commercial exploitation 
of forests in seventies.  
KYA HAIN JANGAL KE UPKAAR?  
MITTI PAANI AUR BAYAAR. 
MITTI PAANI AUR BAYAAR. 
ZO HAIN ZINE KE ADHAAR. 
(What are the benefits from forests? Soil, 
water and air that are essential for our 
survival.) 
 In the cited paragraph, the FD admitted that 
the commercial exploitation of forests in the 
1970s was “indiscriminate” and praised the 
environmental consciousness of the Chipko 
movement. This indicates how the attitude of 
the FD completely changed in 20 years 
because, according to Poldane (1987), almost 
all FD officials in late 1983 answered the 
question about what should happen if the felling 
ban were to be lifted by saying that “though the 
needs of people and hill industry should be met, 
there must also be export of the surplus to the 
plains. Only one man -- a Deputy Conservator -
- said that there should be no export. The 
general opinion is that it is a waste not to fell 
trees in areas distant from people.” (Poldane 
1987: 707) In the beginning of the 1980s, soon 
after the ban on felling was announced in 1981, 
no one in the FD praised the Chipko movement.  
 Second, how did the movement affect the 
anti-business policy? It might be said that the 
movement was not really responsible for the 
loss of opportunities for the advancement of 
private forest industries, because at that time 
such opportunities could not be realised due to 
the defeat of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Mrs. Gandhi’s staunch hostility towards 
capitalists (cf. Mawdsley 2000: 161-164).  
 Third, how did the movement contribute to 
the devolution of forest rights to Panchayats? 
There is no sign of any obvious contribution to 
this matter. However, the efforts for tree 
plantations by the movement might have 
implanted in the local people a degree of zeal 
for the self-management of forests.  
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2. The Formation of the Networks of Local 
Environmental Activists 
A scholar of social movement theory, Tarrow, 
argued that, as a cycle of protest was extended, 
simultaneous processes of institutionalisation 
and radicalisation tended to occur, as some 
sections of the movement started to become 
involved in formal political processes (to form a 
political party, for instance) and the opponents 
of such a move tried to differentiate themselves 
by taking more progressive or extreme stands. 
In the case of the Chipko movement, however, 
neither institutionalisation nor radicalisation in 
their proper senses happened. Although the 
activists of the movement became involved in 
the political process that we saw in the previous 
section, no one became a politician or an agent 
of the government and no political party 
incorporated the movement. Most of the 
activists remained activists in another 
movement, which followed the Chipko 
movement, by occasionally interacting with the 
authorities, instead of radicalising and breaking 
off their interaction with the authorities. In 
other words, they acquired the art of living as 
social movement activists during the movement 
and retained it even after the conclusion of the 
movement.  
 During the Chipko movement and the 
Himalaya Foot March, which followed soon 
after the movement, many young activists were 
trained. They became professional social 
activists later by basing their activities at the 
grassroots level in the Uttarakhand and other 
places in India. It is noteworthy that most of 
them were educated by a senior activist, 
Sunderlal Bahuguna, either when they lived 
together in a student hostel (in the cases of K. 
Prasun and S. S. Bisht) or when they took part 
in the foot marches (in the cases of D. S. Negi, 
K. B. Upmanyu, and P. Hegde).  
 Soon after the Chipko movement ended on 
March 18, 1981, Bahuguna, in order to survey 
the environmental and social situation of the 
entire Himalayan region and to propagate the 
Chipko message (to protect trees from cutting 
by hugging) in that region, started the Himalaya 
Foot March (also called the Kashmir-Kohima 
Foot March) on May 30, 1981. The idea was 
born during Bahuguna’s eleven-day fast from 
April 2, 1981 at Uttarkashi in Uttarakhand. 
Bahuguna and D. S. Negi completed the 
4,870km walk across the Himalayan region 
from the western edge (at Srinagar in the State 
of Jammu and Kashimir) to the eastern edge (at 
Kohima in the State of Nagaland, which they 
reached in February 1983) with three breaks. 
Everywhere they went, Bahuguna and the 
others actively sought meetings with 
politicians, government officials, scientists and 
students, compiling reports regarding the 
environmental situation in each area and 
submitting them to the local government. Many 
youths who marched became social activists. In 
other words, the walkers in the march (and also 
in the Askot-Arakot march in 1974, which I
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mentioned in an earlier section) were educated 
and trained to become professional social 
activists. 
 This section describes, through the example 
of Dhoom Singh Negi, how some youngsters 
became activists by committing to the Chipko 
movement and the foot marches.  
 
Dhoom Singh Negi 
Dhoom Singh Negi (1938-) was a principal at 
an elementary school before he became a full-
time activist in 1974. He told me that there 
were two reasons behind his switching 
careers.11 After he participated in the study 
meetings on environmental issues that were 
carried out by Bahuguna, Negi became 
acquainted with global environmental 
movements. He also took part in a learning 
camp with local loggers, which was conducted 
as part of the study meetings, and he seriously 
discussed forest problems with the labourers by 
sharing room and board with them. In addition 
to these opportunities to learn about the 
problems of the forest, he realised first hand the 
seriousness of the environmental degradation in 
his locality. At that time, the loggers cut down 
every tree, including small ones, and landslides 
frequently occurred on the barren hills. These 
landsides caused severe damage to the villagers 
below, but they could not receive any 
                                                
11 An interview with Dhoom Singh Negi by the author 
on September 21, 2006, at Piplet in the Tehri distrist, 
Uttaranchal (Uttarakhand), India. 
compensation for their broken irrigation 
systems, such as the watermills. Negi, after 
facing such a pitiable situation, changed his 
opinion and decided that the forest should be 
protected at all costs, rather than choosing the 
alternative of inviting small-scale logging 
contractors in and asking them to employ local 
people as he had thought in the initial stage of 
his commitment to the Chipko movement.12 
These experiences convinced him of the 
necessity of having committed activists to help 
solve the forest’s problems.  
 In the agitation at Advani village in 1978, 
Negi became one of the key organisers. He 
played a crucial role at the initial stage of the 
movement by fasting against the ’villagers’ 
mood of abandonment regarding the 
deforestation. His five-day fast stirred the 
morale of the villagers and many people started 
to take part in the movement after that.  
 After the Chipko movement, he co-
organised the Himalaya foot march with 
Bahuguna in 1981-83. Those days of marching 
with Bahuguna brought him the confidence to 
live as an activist and he learned much about 
the tactics of mobilising local people. During 
those foot marches, Bahuguna demanded the 
co-walkers join the march without any money. 
The marchers were to ask for lodging and meals 
from the villagers in the villages they reached at 
                                                
12 According to Negi, most of the villagers support the 
idea because they are basically farmers, and farmers 
naturally aim to protect their farms, villages and the 
environment. 
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the end of each day. Although Negi confessed 
that they, as vegetarians, suffered a little from 
the meals they received when they were in 
Northeast India, where almost all the local 
people were non-vegetarians, they did not 
experience any difficulties regarding 
communication and accommodation. Also, 
Bahuguna and Negi brought many books in 
their rucksacks and sold them at each town they 
visited, and they used this money to purchase 
necessary items such as batteries for their loud-
hailers. In order to mobilise local people to 
attend their gatherings in the public squares, 
they employed such strategies as setting one 
roti (an Indian bread) per household as a 
participation fee for the meetings. They 
appealed to people’s curiosity and urged them 
to come to the meetings. Negi was trained to 
live as an activist through such on-site 
education.  
 He also participated in the anti-Tehri dam 
movement until the mid-1990s and in several 
other environmental movements in his area, 
such as the Save Seeds Movement, which 
aimed to preserve the diversity in traditional 
grain and vegetable seeds. He has been a 
professional social activist who is at present 
also living off his farming.  
 These activists basically work in their local 
areas. It is important that most of them are 
connected with each other through frequent 
exchanges by phone, letter or e-mail, occasional 
visits and irregular meetings called “mitra 
milan (gatherings of friends).” This loose 
network has been functioning as a mobilisation 
tool when some of the activists in the network 
need other activists’ help to organise meetings 
or demonstrations.  
 Thus, the Chipko movement has also 
produced a new generation of professional 
social activists in the Uttarakhand and in other 
places in India, and these activists are 
connected with each other through their 
networks.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper clarifies, first, that the Chipko 
movement contributed to the dissemination of 
the State Government order for the total ban on 
green felling. On the other hand, the movement 
was not responsible for the loss of opportunities 
for the advancement of private forest industries. 
Second, the Chipko movement has also 
produced a new generation of professional 
social activists in the Uttarakhand and in other 
places in India, and these activists are 
connected with each other through their 
networks.
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